By Pradeep S Mehta
When Chris Minns, premier of New South Wales in Australia, and Devendra Fadnavis, chief minister of Maharashtra in India, signed a renewed sister-state agreement in Mumbai this September, the focus areas were clean energy, advanced manufacturing, technology, critical minerals and mining expertise, and education and skills.
The two governments also agreed to produce a joint action plan within 90 days. It was a sensible deal. But ask who will scrutinise whether it is delivered, and the answer is awkward: no legislator in either state has a formal role.
That gap is the weak point of the India-Australia partnership, and it is widening as the relationship deepens.
Agreements written in capitals, delivered in states: July’s joint declaration on defence and security cooperation commits both countries to resilient supply chains, critical minerals and clean energy technologies. Read the list again and ask who actually controls the levers.
In India, land, water and agriculture are state subjects, and states shape the investment climate through power tariffs, permits and industrial policy. In Australia, the states own and regulate onshore minerals, run universities’ and TAFE colleges' funding frameworks, and administer planning. A summit can announce a critical-minerals corridor. Only a state can approve the mine, the land or the training pipeline.
The asymmetry, then, is: Australia has standing India friendship groups at both its federal parliament and (in some cases) state parliaments; India has the new friendship-group mechanism only at the Union or Parliament level, and at the state level relies on ad hoc MoUs signed during individual visits rather than any institutionalised legislative body for ongoing engagement.
Yet the engagement architecture stops at the national door. Executives sign sister-state memoranda. Legislatures, which write the laws at the state level, that make those memoranda real, are absent.
Two dormant forums: At the national level, the picture is not much better. In February, the Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla constituted Parliamentary Friendship Groups with more than 60 countries, Australia included.
Within months, MPs were complaining of no communication or word of future activities since February. Such groups are also co-terminus with the tenure of the Lok Sabha, so they vanish with each House. Australia’s parliamentary country group for India has, by most accounts, been equally quiet.
The one genuine legislature-to-legislature instrument is a 2017 memorandum on parliamentary cooperation between Maharashtra’s Legislative Council (Upper House) and the New South Wales Parliament. It is a single bilateral pact, hosted under an executive framework, and it has no successors. It is the exception that proves the rule. However, the legislative council is not as powerful as the legislative assembly, where members are chosen by the larger electorate in the state.
What legislators see that ministers do not: Legislators sit where complaints land. They hear from the student whose course credit was not recognised, the exporter stuck in a licensing queue, a municipal council struggling with a waste contract. They are the first to spot where a Victorian rule collides with a Karnataka one, and where a summit promise is lying quietly dormant in a state government department.
Both federations also give state legislatures a formal part in national law-making. In India, Article 252 lets state legislatures pass resolutions asking Parliament to legislate on matters within state competence. In Australia, Section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution allows states to refer powers to the Commonwealth (federal government). Both countries rely heavily on concurrent jurisdiction. Each has hard-won experience in managing overlaps, and neither has compared notes.
Then there is accountability. Intergovernmental deals negotiated by executives deserve democratic scrutiny, particularly where they touch land, water and minerals. A standing legislative forum would give citizens, not just ministers and investors, a view of what has transpired at the state level.
A modest design: Nobody needs a supranational body, and the Union List will rightly keep foreign policy in Delhi and likewise in Canberra. What is needed is a structured channel, built in four parts:
An annual dialogue of select Indian state legislators and Australian state and territory parliamentarians, hosted alternately in each country, perhaps through the existing Commonwealth Parliamentary Association branches rather than a new bureaucracy. Thematic committees on topics such as mining and critical minerals, education and skills, water, health and clean energy, each reporting to both sets of legislatures. Model-law exchange, so that a state drafting a mining-safety or skills-recognition statute can see how a counterpart handled it. Twinning of complementary economies, such as a mineral-rich Indian state paired with Western Australia, or a university-heavy state with Victoria, each pairing tied to a deliverable rather than a photograph.
The same logic extends below the state. Australian state constitutions recognise local government, while India’s 73rd and 74th Amendments created empowered panchayats (village councils) and urban municipalities. Their legislators and officials could exchange lessons on service delivery and fiscal devolution, which is the real grassroots dimension of this idea.
The objection, and the answer: Sceptics will call it another talking shop, and the fear is fair. The friendship groups show how quickly symbolic bodies lose momentum. The safeguard is to bind the forum to specific outcomes: the recently signed 90-day NSW-Maharashtra action plan is an obvious first test, with a short annual report tabled in their legislatures. A forum that must account for delivery is harder to ignore than one that only meets and eats.
The India-Australia relationship has strong foundations at the top, in defence, trade and technology, and a growing human connection at the bottom, through students, workers and diaspora communities. What it lacks is the rung between them, where laws are made and commitments either become real or lapse.
Building that rung would cost little. Leaving it missing may cost a great deal more.
Mehta is the secretary-general of CUTS International, a 40+ year old global public policy research and advocacy group. The article has been co-authored with Anjali Shekhawat, senior research associate at CUTS.
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